Kay Sieverding (Draft)
641 Basswood Ave
Verona WI 53593
608 848 5721 kaysieverding@aol.com
1/29/10
Raymond Husler, Acting Director
Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Criminal Section, PHB
Washington, D.C. 20530
USPO Confirmation number 420 20530 9405 5036 9930 0126 6755 18
RE: Official Misconduct Complaint against former judge Edward Nottingham for Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 242), Conspiracy to Deprive Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 241), Extortion by a federal official (18 U.S.C. § 872), Witness Intimidation (18 USC § 1512), Witness Retaliation (18 USC § 1513), and/or Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. (18 USC § 373)
Dear Sirs:
I called the Public Integrity Section last Friday and after discussing my complaint, the intake officer advised me to file a written complaint of the acts against me by former judge Nottingham. I don’t see how anyone could look at the evidence and think that the evidence is inadequate or that Nottingham’s acts towards me were not Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 242), Conspiracy to Deprive Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 241), Extortion by a federal official (18 U.S.C. § 872), Witness Intimidation (18 USC § 1512), Witness Retaliation (18 USC § 1513), and/or Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. (18 USC § 373)
Nottingham’s stated intention was to cause my husband and I to withdraw a Rule 60b(3) action we filed in the Federal District of Columbia (05-cv-01283) which complained that in the original case before Judge Nottingham, Federal District of Colorado (02-cv-1950) no facts were found, our summary judgment motions were struck, and the defense counsel billed for over 20 ex parte conferences about the status of pending motions and timing of rulings.
A.) Summary of Story:
I was a confident pro se civil plaintiff litigant relying on my MIT educated research skills. I had a 42 USC § 1983/1985 case based on first amendment retaliation/ extortion/ obstruction of justice for complaining about conversion of the road adjoining our home and extra buildings built in violation of the zoning by adjoining neighbor, the city council president. I started with admissible document evidence adequate to prove most of my stated facts.
I filed suit against the Colorado Bar Association, City of Steamboat Springs et al. in the Federal District Court of Colorado. My case was reassigned to Nottingham in 2003. It was later documented that starting in Feb 2003 Nottingham had a weekly appointments with prostitutes and because of the expense, I don’t believe he could afford that on his income as a federal judge.
I sued for retaliation because of my complaints about my former adjoining neighbor, the Steamboat Springs city council president, Kevin Bennett, built extra buildings in violation of the zoning. It has since been publicly revealed by the Steamboat Pilot that Kevin Bennett was convicted for conspiracy to sell hashish and the Routt County Assessor, Mike Kerrigan, was quoted as saying “there are many illegal buildings and enforcement of the regulations is lax”. Part of the retaliation I complained about included baseless prosecution of me for harassment of the wife of the city council president. There was no warrant for that and no arrest. The Routt County prosecutor, Elizabeth Wittemyer, refused to say what the probable cause was. She dismissed the charges when I pled not guilty but then made a public announcement that there was probable cause and a victim but a trial was too expensive. Wittemyer’s husband Chris was a real estate developer who soon after got a permit for a new ski area he tried to sell for $20 million and I think that was Mrs. Wittemeyer’s motivation for keeping a criminal charge open for 6 months without complying with statutory criminal procedure starting with a criminal complaint.
I was accused of sending emails to the city council complaining about government corruption, passing out flyers complaining about government corruption and, while standing on the street in front of my home, telling Jane Bennett, the wife of the city council president, that just because her husband was president of the city council that didn’t give her the right to break the law. Those weren’t crimes and were protected by the First Amendment and no one has claimed that what I said and wrote wasn’t accurate. The local judge and my neighbor’s attorney, in the presence of Jane Bennett without her objection, introduced the claim that I molested her, although Jane Bennett had never complained of sexual molestation (by myself anyway) and testified under oath that there was no inappropriate touching and we had very little interaction. She got an intimate partner restraining order based on the claim I molested her, and then followed me around town calling the police to arrest me whenever she claimed she was near me. She filed a police report saying that she had followed me though Wal-Mart trying to take my picture because she thought that if she did so I would be arrested. She complained to the police that I had sent a fax of Intent to Sue to the city council. She parked next to my drive and she complained to the police that she saw me in my yard. She complained to the police that I talked about the weather to her construction worker. Every-time she complained the police came to my home and the police went to the school to interview my son. Just this week she called the police in Verona, WI, and asked them to arrest me because I filed a motion. She didn’t file an objection to my motion but hoped that witness intimidation under color of law would work.
We had to sell our house below appraised value and move away because we were afraid that she would induce the police to arrest me and that the judge who made up the allegation of molestation would imprison me for 18 months based on her allegation that we were within 30 feet of each other. There was also a bullet hole through our window, and the police refused to investigate its origin.
The Routt County prosecutor Elizabeth Wittemyer bought insurance from Underwriters at Lloyds London. I can prove this because her lawyer filed verified copies of his bills to Lloyds. (see attached) These bills and verification under penalty of perjury are available in the federal court District of Colorado document 465 and also in the 10th Circuit court of appeals. The only reference to Lloyds on the state website was a 1996 publication saying that Article 13 regulates the formation of a reciprocal insurance exchange. ... The most famous example of an exchange is Lloyds of London". CRS 10-13-3 requires that such insurance agents file with the Division of Insurance "A copy of the form of policy contract or agreement under or by which such insurance is to be effected or exchanged", "The location of the office from which such contracts or agreements are to be issued" and "The kind of insurance to be effected or exchanged". The Colorado AG’s office has confirmed that it doesn’t have those records.
The magistrate reporting to Nottingham wrote: “David Brougham has advised me that in the event that plaintiffs obtain service upon any of the municipal defendants he will be the attorney for such defendants. In light of that fact, I will direct that Mr. Brougham also attend the status conference” p. 7 “order setting status conference 1/10/03 Magistrate Schlatter” Colorado 02- 1950 document 9, p. 9
The Lloyds’ lawyer billed Lloyds and also another insurance company, Colorado Intergovernmental Risksharing Agency, for over 20 otherwise private calls to and from the court. These billing itemizations included:
1.) On 2/12/03:“Review new letter from Sieverding to Tremaine regarding Jane Bennett and many city defendants. Telephone call to Dave Brougham—discussed pleadings from Wisconsin court and Sieverding letter. Conference call to Magistrate Schlatter. Further discussion with Brougham on notice letter to Sieverding.”(e86, Anthony Lettunich to City of Steamboat Springs, CO) (p.9.) (see exhibit p. )
2.) 2/28/03 “Telephone call from David Brougham regarding new pleading from Sieverding and review pleading with Brougham as to most significant allegations. Telephone call with….and Clerk’s office” (Anthony Lettunich bill to City of Steamboat Springs )
3.) 6/11/03 “Telephone call to court regarding response to motion to compel” (Brougham to Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing)
4.) 6/16/03 “Telephone call to court regarding status of plaintiffs’ response regarding motion to dismiss” (Brougham to CIRSA)
5.) 6/24/03 “Telephone call from Dave Brougham (defense attorney for government defendants) advising me that the Clerk for Magistrate Schlatter advised that no Reply would be necessary”. (Anthony Lettunich bill to City of Steamboat Springs, CO)
6.) “6/23/03 confer with Van Pelt regarding reply issues. Telephone call to Court regarding need for same”.
7.) 7/2/03 “Telephone call from clerk regarding certain motions.”
8.) 8/4/03 “Telephone call to court regarding filings by plaintiffs since (7/31) order”.
9.) 8/14/03“Confer with court clerk regarding status of ruling on motions.”
10.) 8/15/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions and timing of ruling”.
11.) 9/24/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions.”
12.) 10/14/03 “Confer with court clerk regarding filing of recommendation regarding pending motions.”
13.) 10/31/03 “Review actual court file regarding most recent pleadings, ‘striking’ majority of same, confer with court clerk regarding same.”
14.) 11/21/03 “confer with court clerk regarding status of pleadings”
15) 1/07/04 “Confer with court regarding status of plaintiff pleadings, pending motions, etc. Analyze motion to enjoin grounds, etc.”
The Lloyds lawyer, David Brougham, claimed that Kevin Bennett and Elizabeth Wittemeyer had “immunity” and therefore he claimed that he wasn’t required to engage in an evidentiary hearing. Before filing that complaint, I had filed other complaints in other courts that were never served and Brougham claimed that claims preclusion does not require a decision on the merits. Nottingham dismissed my case without filing a memorandum or opinion. When I asked him why, the only reason he stated was his incorrect belief that I “lost in the state court in Steamboat Springs”. I dismissed that case without service so I could refile in federal court. The Supreme Court had ruled many times that a decision on the merits is required for claims preclusion. I relied on and quoted “Finally, if Rule 41(b) did mean what respondent suggests, we would surely have relied upon it in our cases recognizing the claim-preclusive effect of federal judgments in federal-question cases. Yet for over half a century since the promulgation of Rule 41(b), we have not once done so. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 488-489, n. 9 (1994); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, supra, at 398; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 324, n. 12 (1971).” SEMTEK INTERNATIONAL INC. V. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 128 Md.App. 39, 531 U.S. 497, 531 U.S. 497, 736 A.2d 1104, 149 L.Ed.2d 32, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (U.S. 02/27/2001) but Nottingham ignored those Supreme Court cases.
The magistrate wrote, and Nottingham claimed that he approved, “Prosecutors have absolute immunity”. However, as the 5th Circuit explained: “The district court held that the defendants were shielded by absolute immunity because their actions were taken in their role as prosecutors. We disagree. Prosecutors are immune from damage actions brought for conduct performed in the role of a prosecutor. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, the Supreme Court in Imbler left open the question whether this immunity extends to actions in which the prosecutor acts as an investigator or administrator, rather than as an advocate. 96 S.Ct. at 995. We answered this question in Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981). After examining relevant Supreme Court decisions since Imbler, and the policies underlying the immunity defense and section 1983, we held that "a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he engages in activities outside his quasi-judicial role." 625 F.2d at 510. Hardy W. RYLAND and Alma Odessa Ryland, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alfred B. SHAPIRO, et al., Defendants, Edwin O. Ware and Edward E. Roberts, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
Wittemyer’s statements were given to the press and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
Comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process just because they are made by a prosecutor. At the press conference, Fitzsimmons did not act in "'his role as advocate for the State,'"… The conduct of a press conference does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions…. the speech of a counsel is privileged by the occasion on which it is spoken " Stephen Buckley v. Michael Fitzsimmons et al. USC 1993.
Wittemyer acted in conspiracy with city council president Kevin Bennett to deter me and undermine my complaints that the City of Steamboat Springs was allowing Bennett to build in violation of the zoning and therefore the complaint was cognizable under 42 USC § 1983. Further proof of the conspiracy is that Jane Bennett’s lawyer represented to the county judge that there were criminal charges against me in a successful effort to get a restraining order against me.
To stop me from getting an evidentiary hearing before another judge, Nottingham issued an order against further litigation in both state and federal courts, although there was no statutory basis and the Supreme Court ruled: “Any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper by general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions [to the Anti-Injunction Act]…. not to be enlarged by loose statutory constructions.” ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. ENGINEERS 398 U.S. 281 U.S. Supreme Court 1970.
In Nottingham’s court, no statutory exemption to the Anti-Injunction Act was cited, there was no motion for an injunction, no injunction bond, and nothing complying with Rule 65(d), which prohibits an injunction from referencing a complaint or other document. This violated the Anti-Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
Because Nottingham found no facts and stated no laws when he dismissed our case, no party can point to anywhere in 02-cv-1950 and show where there was a decision on the merits. The order against litigation was a way to evade the limits of the res judicata defense, that there be a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court had ruled that “It is settled that the prohibition of §2283 (the Anti Injunction Act) cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties” (OKLAHOMA PACKING CO. V. GAS CO. 309 U.S. C 4 9 U.S. Supreme Court 1940) but, when I tried to get a hearing from another court, Nottingham claimed that he could enforce an order against litigation by putting me in jail to force me to do what he wanted. The Supreme Court ruled in YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS, 481 U. S. 787 (1987), “The manner in which the court's prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by Congress…. the court erred in appointing as prosecutors counsel for an interested party in the underlying civil litigation… "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." Because of this unique responsibility, federal prosecutors are prohibited from representing the Government in any matter in which they, their family, or their business associates have any interest. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a)…. If a Justice Department attorney pursued a contempt prosecution for violation of an injunction benefiting any client of that attorney involved in the underlying civil litigation, that attorney would be open to a charge of committing a felony under § 208(a). Furthermore, such conduct would violate the ABA ethical provisions, since the attorney could not discharge the obligation of undivided loyalty to both clients where both have a direct interest. [Footnote 16] The Government's interest is in dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary. The private party's interest is in obtaining the benefits of the court's order. While these concerns sometimes may be congruent, sometimes they may not. A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal charges…. as will generally be the case, the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum created opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at least the appearance of impropriety….. prosecution by an interested party may be influenced by improper motives. A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity…. As we said in Bloom, "In modern times, procedures in criminal contempt cases have come to mirror those used in ordinary criminal cases." 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 207. The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with that trend, since "[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision….. We rely today on that authority to hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order.
Nottingham ignored the Supreme Court’s decisions in ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. ENGINEERS, OKLAHOMA PACKING CO. V. GAS CO, and YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS as well as their decisions about immunity and res judicata.
Without any sort of criminal procedure, or any finding that I disturbed a hearing committing “contempt in the presence of the court”, Nottingham ordered USMS to hold me until I did what he wanted. Four months later I agreed to do what he wanted because he threatened to incarcerate my husband too if I didn’t. That was not among the allowed conditions for release from jail. When I didn’t file the motions he demanded in other courts, he issued a defective warrant for my arrest that didn’t state a federal offense on it, wasn’t requested by a government attorney, and wasn’t signed by the Clerk of Court. USMS hunted me down without a valid warrant. When I filed a motion for reconsideration, in another court, Nottingham issued another defective warrant, which again was not requested by an attorney for the government and didn’t state a federal offense. Again USMS hunted me down without a court issued detention order and without a valid warrant. Nottingham informed authorities in Wisconsin that he wanted me detained and brought to him and I was again denied a bail hearing and that time was held for 22 days and brought 1200 miles in chains. I was denied my rights to a probable cause hearing, a Rule 20 hearing, and a bail hearing. Then, after years of abuse and harassment and messing up my actions in other courts, Nottingham said “whoops” and released me.
B.) Summary of Facts:
1.) I have no criminal record at all. I verified every document I filed in every court under penalty of perjury but I have not even been accused of perjury.
2.) Former judge Nottingham ordered me imprisoned by USMS without any criminal procedure three times totaling 5 months as part of an extortionist scheme to deprive my rights to present testimony and file documents in the District of Columbia federal courts and this creates jurisdiction for prosecution for witness intimidation in the District of Columbia.
3.) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42 defines contempt procedure. Summary procedure may only used when there was a disruption of a courtroom. This did not happen in my case. Summary procedure was used in a prescheduled “contempt of court” hearing to address my having filed motions in other courts in violation of former judge Nottingham’s order. Nottingham did not issue the required statement describing “contempt in the presence of the court” and he did not follow the rules of criminal procedure as required. The Sieverdings filed a motion for the procedure to be used but Nottingham denied that as well as their motion for statement of irreparable harm, a statutory requirement for an injunction. See 02-cv-1950 documents 596, 587, 588.
4.) USDOJ has represented in the Federal Register that its Prisoner Tracking Systems are used to hold people who are in custody “pending criminal proceedings”. Congressional appropriations do not include funds for holding citizens without a statutory basis. (See Federal Register Vo. 69 No 89 pp 23213 – 23316)
5.) USDOJ represents on its website and in the Federal Register that prosecution of violations of injunctions are obsolete and refers Congress and the public to contempt is now prosecuted under 18 USC §§s 3285, 3691, 3692 and 10 USC 847, none of which I was charged with. (See Federal Register 63 FR 8659, 8671/ 02/20/98)
6.) USDOJ represents publicly that pretrial detention must serve a “compelling government purpose” (See US Attorney Criminal Resource Manual 26 p. 1)
7.) I was held in Dane County Jail at USMS request for 21 days although by contract with USMS, the jail can only hold “federal detainees, defined as individuals sentenced or charged with a federal offense” even though she was not charged with a federal offense. (See contract 13-01-0032)
8.) I was held at Clear Creek CO jail at USMS request for 124 days although under the county’s contract with USMS, the jail can only hold “persons charged with or convicted of violations of federal law or as a material witness” and she was not a material witness, nor charged with a violation of federal law. (See contract 13-96-0033).
C.) Discussion of judicial immunity issues and citations.
1.) The US Code specifically states that there is no immunity defense for solicitation of a crime of violence and that detention is a crime of violence absent proper criminal procedure.
1.1 ) "Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) or fined.... It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person solicited could not be convicted of the crime because he lacked the state of mind required for its commission, because he was incompetent or irresponsible, or because he is immune from prosecution or is not subject to prosecution." See 18 USC Sec. 373. Solicitation to commit a crime of violence
1.2 ) “The term “physical force” means physical action against another, and includes confinement” see Title 18 § 1515. Definitions for certain provisions.
2.) The Supreme Court has already ruled that a judge can be criminally prosecuted under 18 USC § 242 and other criminal statutes as are other citizens.
2.1) “But judicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability. Judges are immune from section 1983 damages actions, but they are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). DENNIS v. SPARKS ET AL., 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980)
2.2) “Judges who would willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U. S. C. § 242… Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), or civil liability for willful corruption, see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 110-111 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 350, 354 (1872), we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. . . ." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).” O'SHEA v. LITTLETON ET AL., 94 S. Ct. 669, 414 U.S. 488 (U.S. 01/15/1974)
D.) Additional detail and references to statutes and transcripts of court hearings:
1.) On 9/2/05 former judge Nottingham made these threatening statements. They meet the statutory definitions of witness intimidation and extortion:
“I have three United States Marshals here ready to put you in jail. And I am determined to do so, but reluctant to do so. So I’ll ask you one last time, will you withdraw these lawsuits voluntarily?” Nottingham (p. 26 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
“If you fail to withdraw those lawsuits, the next time you’re in this court you better be prepared with your toothbrush, because you will be going to jail. Do you understand that?” Nottingham (page 33 lines 3-5 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
1.1) See 18 USC § 1512 The Witness Intimidation Act “(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;(2) cause or induce any person to –(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;….
1.2) “(h) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.(i) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.”
1.3) (b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for—
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both” 18 USC § 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
1.3.1) Nottingham ordered me taken to him in Colorado. On 6/1/07 Nottingham said “don't we have to start over again on that and look at what she's done and see if what she's done is -- supports another finding of contempt? We need to start over on the contempt proceedings, figure out what it is she's done and when she's done it, and see if that supports any finding of contempt…she could face a jail sentence.” transcript 6/1/07 Nottingham 02-cv-1950.
2.) By imprisoning me to stop me from petitioning other courts, Nottingham deprived me of my 1st Amendment Right to Petition
2.1) “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (First Amendment)
3.) By imprisoning me to stop me from petitioning other courts, Nottingham ignored 28 USC § 1654.
3.1) “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein” 28 USC § 1654. Appearance personally or by counsel
4.) By imprisoning me without charging me with a federal offense, Nottingham deprived me of my 4th Amendment Rights:
4.1) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (4th amendment)
4.2) I was seized and held for over 4 months on Nottingham’s order without a statement of probable cause supported by oath and without a warrant.
4.2.1) Disrupting a courtroom is a crime and Rule 42 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure describes the procedure to be used, but I was not even accused of disrupting a courtroom, and Rule 42 was not followed.
5.) By imprisoning me three times without charging me with a federal offense, for the stated purpose of depriving me of my cause of action in another court, Nottingham three times deprived me of my 5th Amendment Rights.
5.1) “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 5th Amendment
5.2) Due process of law when depriving a person of their liberty is defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure but Nottingham knowingly and intentionally skipped every component of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.) On 9/02/05, there was no government prosecutor and there was no criminal docket. In a criminal prosecution, a criminal docket is opened when a government prosecutor opens a criminal prosecution by filing a criminal complaint or indictment, or when an authorized law enforcement officer makes an arrest immediately followed by a criminal complaint (i.e. apprehended subject on Indian Reservation, US Courthouse, National park etc. seeing subject standing with a gun over a dead body). (See PACER District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 884)
6.1) In response to my FOIA letters, USDOJ stated that the District of Colorado, where Nottingham issued verbal and minute orders to detain me, that the “US Attorney’s Office was not involved in the cases concerning Kay Sieverding”. See PACER document record D.D.C. 09-cv-00562 Sieverding v. USDOJ document 7-2 p. 9, letter from William G. Stewart II AD Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys Freedom of Information & Privacy Staff dated 11/26/08.
6.2) The District of Colorado Office of the Clerk responded to my request for warrants for arrest by mailing that “A search of the court records does not show a criminal case(s) for Kay Sieverding”. See scan of communication from Gregory C. Langham Clerk of Court District of Colorado in District of Columbia PACER reports Case 1:09-cv-00562-JDB Document 20-2 Filed 07/08/2009 Page 41 of 196
6.3) All of the rules of procedure published on the various U.S. Court websites are either civil or criminal or both. None of them are “other procedure, not civil or criminal” and the lower courts are prohibited from creating unpublished procedures. See Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
7.) The Supreme Court ordered that counsel who have a financial motivation are prohibited from serving as prosecutors in a contempt action. See YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS, 481 U. S. 787 (1987) but Nottingham allowed them to serve as prosecutors anyway.
7.1) Nottingham said at what he called a contempt of court conference to the civil insurance defense lawyer contracted by Mutual Insurance of Bermuda: “Now, Mr. Beall, I understand that you are taking the lead on this one, so to speak?” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 3
8.) On 9/02/05, I was taken into indefinite length custody at Nottingham’s order without a detention hearing complying with 18 USC § 3553(a)(2) B-D and 3142(f)(1). B requires criminal conduct. At that time, I had never failed to appear in a court hearing. At no time did I attempt to obstruct justice. Therefore according to the Federal Judicial Commission, Nottingham couldn’t hold a detention hearing based on his own motion.
8.1) Nottingham was specifically not allowed to deprive my liberty for any purpose not necessary for section 3553(a)(2) B-D which are: “(B) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;”
8.2) “Section 3142(f)(1) provides that a detention hearing shall be held
on the government’s motion in a case involving (1) a crime of violence; (2) an offense carrying a penalty of life imprisonment or death; (3) a federal drug offense carrying a penalty of ten years or more; or (4) any felony following convictions for two or more of the above three offenses, two or more comparable state or local offenses, or a combination of such offenses. The court may hold a hearing on its own motion or the government’s motion in a case that involves serious risk of flight or serious risk that the person will attempt to obstruct justice” Bail Reform Act of 1984 p. 12
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf
9.) On 9/02/05, there were no sworn witnesses and Nottingham would not allow cross examination of witnesses. However the Federal Judicial Commission writes that there is a recognized right to cross-examine witnesses at a detention hearing.
9.1) “Section 3142(f) affords defendants an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses appearing at the hearing”. http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf p. 25
9.2) On 9/02/05 Nottingham said: “You’re going to be allowed to make a presentation but its not the presentation that you probably had in mind because I’m not going to listen” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 20
9.2.1) Nottingham denied me my right to put on a defense.
9.3) “They do not have the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing”.
See transcript 9/02/05 Nottingham’s court 02-cv-1950 document 884 pp. 13-14.
9.4) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” 6th Amendment
10.) On 9/02/05, I was taken into what ended up being 124 days of straight detention on Nottingham’s order without information or indictment being filed within 30 days as required by statute and by the 6th Amendment:
10.1) “Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. The Act establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. The information or indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of arrest or service of the summons. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (See US Attorneys criminal resource manual 628).
10.2) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial” 6th amendment.
10.3) “Given the unchallenged determination that petitioner was denied a speedy trial, the District Court judgment of conviction must be set aside” STRUNK v. UNITED STATES, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 412 U.S. 434 (U.S. 06/11/1973)
11.) The Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee a right to counsel but I was told in Nottingham’s presence that I did not have a right to counsel and he did not object.
11.1) “At the detention hearing, defendants have the right to an attorney and the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford one.” Bail Reform Act of 1984 p 24 http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf
11.2) “They do not have a right to counsel” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 13 (Christopher Beall, an insurance lawyer)
11.3) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 6th amendment
12.) Nottingham released both my husband and myself based on orders that we would not continue in civil litigation in other courts. That violated 18 U.S.C.§ 3583 because it was a greater deprivation of liberty than “necessary for” any government purpose since the allowed purposes are enumerated. It was a deprivation of my rights for former judge Nottingham to say that I couldn’t file motions or appear in other courts.
12.1) “The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition - (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D), (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issue by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a);”18 U.S.C.§ 3583. Inclusion of a term of supervised release after imprisonment)
12.2) “If you fail to withdraw those lawsuits, the next time you appear in this court you better bring your toothbrush because you are going to jail.” Nottingham to David Sieverding on 9/02/05 (page 33 lines 3-5 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
12.3) “So you’ll stay out of jail if all these cases are dismissed in time for me to vacate the hearing. Otherwise the next time you show up, you pack your toothbrush, because you are going to jail….Are the defendants suggesting that the plaintiff be jailed until she purges herself of her contempt? P. 6 …” you can’t weasel out of it.” P. 10. 2/14/06 transcript document 876 Judge Nottingham
13.) Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a) requires that a written statement of reasons accompany a release order, but on 1/4/06 Nottingham released me pursuant to an oral agreement to do what he wanted and without a written statement.
13.1) There is a standard USCOURTS form for conditional release based on statutes but Nottingham didn’t use it.
13.2) The trial court “must explain its reasons for determining that the particular requirement is an indispensable component of the conditions for release.” Bail Reform Act of 1984 http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf P.3.
14.) On 2/2/06, Nottingham issued a warrant for my arrest that didn’t reference a criminal statute and wasn’t accompanied by a statement of probable cause and this violated my 4th amendment rights again.
15.) On 9/22/06, Nottingham issued another warrant for my arrest that didn’t reference a criminal statute and wasn’t accompanied by a statement of probable cause and this violated my 4th amendment rights again.
16.) I downloaded over 60 warrants for arrest for the District of Colorado from PACER and Nottingham’s warrant for my arrest was substantially different than all the others.
16.1) It was not captioned “U.S.A. v Kay Sieverding” but instead was captioned “Kay Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association).
16.2) It was not requested by an attorney for the government.
16.3) Nottingham didn’t sign the warrant and neither did the clerk of court. The only signature was from Nottingham’s docket clerk.
16.4) All the other warrants had a written description of a crime and also the numbers of the crime but the one for me had neither.
16.5) All the other warrants had fill in the blank squares but mine did not.
17.) On 9/22/06, Nottingham made this threatening statement:
“She knows that she is not to pursue those lawsuits. And for her to suggest that I told her to dismiss those lawsuits, and that does not cover her appeals from those lawsuits is silly…she might dismiss everything before those marshals get to her…once she’s in custody she will not get out of custody until those are actually dismissed…She was told in unequivocal terms to dismiss both those lawsuits …what has to happen is those lawsuits have to be dead, lifeless, and she is not to do anything to pursue them on appeal, motion for reconsideration, or anything else... she faces a real possibility of incarceration as she knows because it’s happened before” 9/22/06 transcript District of Colorado Judge Edward Nottingham 02-1950
18.) On 5/11/07, according to then District of Western Wisconsin clerk of court/magistrate Theresa Owens, Nottingham told her that he wanted me detained and brought to him even though he knew there was no legal reason for it and his requesting that I be brought to him exceeded his jurisdiction. I was not charged with a crime and I was not a reluctant witness. Assistant US Attorney Robert A. Anderson appeared and said “the government is not a party to this”. Nottingham had me held for three weeks without charges and brought 1200 miles in chains and when I got there he said “whoops” and let her go. It was clearly witness retaliation and he thought no one would hold him accountable.
18.1) On 5/11/07 I was denied her right to a Bail Hearing and then she was held at Nottingham’s order for three weeks. The public defender argued that she had a right to a bail hearing if she was accused of a crime but the supervising clerk/magistrate denied that, in conspiracy with Nottingham. See DWWI 06-mj-00019-slc document 10 transcript
18.2) 28 U.S.C. § 1693 speaks for itself and says “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil action in a district court.” but Nottingham in Colorado ordered me arrested in Wisconsin for a civil matter in Colorado.
19.) Nottingham caused the defective warrants and other written threats to be sent to me and therefore I believe the communications were extortion – mailing threatening statements designed to extort from me something of value, my claims in other courts:
19.1) “Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any communication, with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to injure the property or
reputation of the addressee or of another, or the reputation of a deceased person, or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both” 18 U.S.C. § 876 : US Code - Section 876: Mailing threatening communications.
19.2) “Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color or pretense of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; but if the amount so extorted or demanded does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 872. Extortion by officers or employees of the United States
20.) The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that injunctions without laws are a matter of great public importance.
20.1) “Mr. Justice Holland in Kellner v. District Court (1953), 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, said that a case in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the persons or subject matter also involves a matter of great public importance. Thus construing our rules and the cases we have referred to, we determine that the facts here involved present matters of sufficient public importance to call for the intervention of this court to prevent a manifest injustice. The Rule is made absolute.” Stull v. District Court of Pueblo County, 308 P.2d 1006, 135 Colo. 86 (Colo. 03/18/1957)
21.) I believe that Nottingham’s acts towards me were crimes and that they were premeditated as shown by his refusal to state the procedures that would be used, his refusal to state a statutory basis, his striking the Sieverdings’ motion for the statement of harm to the complaining parties, which is required and his continuation and repetition of the crimes.
22.) Nottingham hired a criminal defense attorney, Stephen C. Peters, and I wrote to him twice to ask if Nottingham was guilty of Witness Retaliation and Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law but he did not deny it.
23.) The Supreme Court has already recognized that a cause of action is property. Nottingham’s stated intention was to take that cause of action from me by forcing me to file motions to dismiss, keeping me from going to a law-library, causing other judges to think of me as a crazy weirdo instead of a competent individual, and causing delay.
24.) Lack of prosecution for use of threats of violence under Color of Law as a vehicle to stop presentment in court contradicts the Principles of Federal Prosecution:
24.1) USDOJ publishes a report 9-27.000 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION stating that:
“The attorney for the government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person' s conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, prosecution should be declined because:
1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution;
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or
3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”
24.2) Nottingham has escaped all investigation and prosecution simply by resigning his federal judgeship and he is now selling his services as a lawyer.
24.3) The State of Colorado Supreme Court has already ruled that the issuing of an injunction without a law is a matter of great public interest.
24.4) This is an easy to imitate crime and the insurance company involved, Underwriters at Lloyds London, apparently sells insurance all over the United States.
24.5.) The potential punishment for solicitation of a crime of violence is 20 years.
24.5.) If prosecuted as Witness Intimidation, under 18 USC § 1512, the use of threat of force to delay, prevent or deter presentment, is punishable by 10-20 years.
24.6) I wouldn’t have resisted the extortion the way that I did, sitting in jail without charges for over 4 months, if the underlying litigation wasn’t very important to me. Nottingham denied me not only compensation from my lawsuit, but also a name-clearing hearing after the Lloyds’ customer brought charges against me without being even willing to say what the probable cause was, a clear constitutional violation. Nottingham denied my motion for discovery of the probable cause for which Wittemyer prosecuted me. In my opinion, Nottingham tried to make me unemployable, tried to get my husband to abandon me, and tried to induce me to commit suicide.
25.) Even though Nottingham has not yet been charged, because I was hurt by what I believe were federal crimes I have rights as a crime victim under the Justice for All Act of 2004:
25.1) No federal prosecutor has yet met with my husband and or myself to discuss USDOJ’s decisions to prosecute or not prosecute Nottingham as is required by the Justice for All Act of 2004, and I was denied my enumerated rights:
25.1.1) “For purposes of the Act, a victim is “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia… Either the crime victim or the Government may assert the victim’s rights in the district court.” I have been denied my enumerated rights including “The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.… “The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case. The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law…. The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” See
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/justforall/fs000311.pdf
25.1.2) “The investigative agency’s responsibilities begin with the report of the crime and extend through the prosecution of the case….. Responsible officials must advise a victim pursuant to this section at the earliest opportunity after detection of a crime at which it may be done without interfering with an investigation…. The responsible official of the investigative agency shall arrange for a victim to receive reasonable protection from a suspected offender and persons acting in concert with or at the behest of the suspected offender…. Upon request by a victim or witness, the responsible official should assist in notifying— The creditors of the victim or witness, when appropriate, if the crime or cooperation in its investigation affects his or her ability to make timely payments… Upon filing of charges by the prosecutor, this responsibility transfers to the responsible official of the prosecutor’s office… For cases in which a litigating division of the Department of Justice is solely responsible, the responsible official is the chief of the section having responsibility for the case. The Department attorney handling such a case shall perform the same duties under these AG Guidelines as are required of a U.S. Attorney.”
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
26.) I believe I have a right to mandatory restitution for what I believe were Nottingham’s crimes against me.
26.1.) “The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 expanded mandatory restitution to virtually all crimes committed in violation of Title 18 of the United States Code.” (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A) see
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf p. 8.
26.2.) “For purposes of providing the services described in these AG guidelines, a victim is “a person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime.” (42 U.S.C. ' 10607(e)(2)) http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf p.9.
26.3) “Prosecutors, victim-witness coordinators, investigators, probation officers, clerks of the court, and financial litigation units all share an important role in ensuring that victims receive full and timely restitution. DOJ employees working at each stage of a criminal case—investigating, charging, negotiating plea agreements, advocating for appropriate sentences, and enforcing criminal judgments—must give careful consideration to the need to provide full restitution to the victims of the offenses and should work together as authorized by law to ensure that full and timely restitution is paid… http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
26.4) The MVRA requires courts to impose the full amount of restitution (without regard to the defendant’s economic circumstances) in most of the commonly prosecuted Federal offenses, including virtually all Title 18 property offenses and all crimes of violence. (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A) The only exception to mandatory restitution is for an offense against property with respect to which the court makes a finding from facts on the record either that (a) the number of identifiable victims is so large that restitution is impracticable or (b) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victims’ losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A(c)(3)) http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
27.) Nottingham also violated the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 14-19 by incarcerating me for acts not recognized as crimes in international law. I’m considering filing a complaint with the United Nations because the United States violated the International Covenant by incarcerating me without a criminal charge.
27.1) Article 14 “To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it” but I was told that I didn’t have a right to a lawyer.
27.2) Article 14 “To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him” but I was told in Nottingham’s presence that I was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and I was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses.
27.3) Article 14 “Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt” but Nottingham said he would not release me unless I filed a motions that would have effectively said that I was guilty of being a vexatious litigant.”
27.4) Article 15 “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.” but Nottingham jailed me for filing papers in other courts.
27.5) Article 16 “Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law” but Nottingham stated in Court that he had called other courts and asked them to dismiss my case. Christopher Beall also stated in Nottingham’s court that he had called the clerk in another court and asked them to dismiss my case.
27.6) Article 17 “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” but noone at USDOJ has protected me.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
Kay Sieverding 1/29/10
641 Basswood Ave. Verona WI 53593 608-848-5721 kaysieverding@aol.com
Certificate of service
Kay Sieverding (Draft)
641 Basswood Ave
Verona WI 53593
608 848 5721 kaysieverding@aol.com
1/29/10
Raymond Husler, Acting Director
Public Integrity Section
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Criminal Section, PHB
Washington, D.C. 20530
USPO Confirmation number 420 20530 9405 5036 9930 0126 6755 18
RE: Official Misconduct Complaint against former judge Edward Nottingham for Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 242), Conspiracy to Deprive Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 241), Extortion by a federal official (18 U.S.C. § 872), Witness Intimidation (18 USC § 1512), Witness Retaliation (18 USC § 1513), and/or Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. (18 USC § 373)
Dear Sirs:
I called the Public Integrity Section last Friday and after discussing my complaint, the intake officer advised me to file a written complaint of the acts against me by former judge Nottingham. I don’t see how anyone could look at the evidence and think that the evidence is inadequate or that Nottingham’s acts towards me were not Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 242), Conspiracy to Deprive Rights Under Color of Law, (18 USC § 241), Extortion by a federal official (18 U.S.C. § 872), Witness Intimidation (18 USC § 1512), Witness Retaliation (18 USC § 1513), and/or Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. (18 USC § 373)
Nottingham’s stated intention was to cause my husband and I to withdraw a Rule 60b(3) action we filed in the Federal District of Columbia (05-cv-01283) which complained that in the original case before Judge Nottingham, Federal District of Colorado (02-cv-1950) no facts were found, our summary judgment motions were struck, and the defense counsel billed for over 20 ex parte conferences about the status of pending motions and timing of rulings.
A.) Summary of Story:
I was a confident pro se civil plaintiff litigant relying on my MIT educated research skills. I had a 42 USC § 1983/1985 case based on first amendment retaliation/ extortion/ obstruction of justice for complaining about conversion of the road adjoining our home and extra buildings built in violation of the zoning by adjoining neighbor, the city council president. I started with admissible document evidence adequate to prove most of my stated facts.
I filed suit against the Colorado Bar Association, City of Steamboat Springs et al. in the Federal District Court of Colorado. My case was reassigned to Nottingham in 2003. It was later documented that starting in Feb 2003 Nottingham had a weekly appointments with prostitutes and because of the expense, I don’t believe he could afford that on his income as a federal judge.
I sued for retaliation because of my complaints about my former adjoining neighbor, the Steamboat Springs city council president, Kevin Bennett, built extra buildings in violation of the zoning. It has since been publicly revealed by the Steamboat Pilot that Kevin Bennett was convicted for conspiracy to sell hashish and the Routt County Assessor, Mike Kerrigan, was quoted as saying “there are many illegal buildings and enforcement of the regulations is lax”. Part of the retaliation I complained about included baseless prosecution of me for harassment of the wife of the city council president. There was no warrant for that and no arrest. The Routt County prosecutor, Elizabeth Wittemyer, refused to say what the probable cause was. She dismissed the charges when I pled not guilty but then made a public announcement that there was probable cause and a victim but a trial was too expensive. Wittemyer’s husband Chris was a real estate developer who soon after got a permit for a new ski area he tried to sell for $20 million and I think that was Mrs. Wittemeyer’s motivation for keeping a criminal charge open for 6 months without complying with statutory criminal procedure starting with a criminal complaint.
I was accused of sending emails to the city council complaining about government corruption, passing out flyers complaining about government corruption and, while standing on the street in front of my home, telling Jane Bennett, the wife of the city council president, that just because her husband was president of the city council that didn’t give her the right to break the law. Those weren’t crimes and were protected by the First Amendment and no one has claimed that what I said and wrote wasn’t accurate. The local judge and my neighbor’s attorney, in the presence of Jane Bennett without her objection, introduced the claim that I molested her, although Jane Bennett had never complained of sexual molestation (by myself anyway) and testified under oath that there was no inappropriate touching and we had very little interaction. She got an intimate partner restraining order based on the claim I molested her, and then followed me around town calling the police to arrest me whenever she claimed she was near me. She filed a police report saying that she had followed me though Wal-Mart trying to take my picture because she thought that if she did so I would be arrested. She complained to the police that I had sent a fax of Intent to Sue to the city council. She parked next to my drive and she complained to the police that she saw me in my yard. She complained to the police that I talked about the weather to her construction worker. Every-time she complained the police came to my home and the police went to the school to interview my son. Just this week she called the police in Verona, WI, and asked them to arrest me because I filed a motion. She didn’t file an objection to my motion but hoped that witness intimidation under color of law would work.
We had to sell our house below appraised value and move away because we were afraid that she would induce the police to arrest me and that the judge who made up the allegation of molestation would imprison me for 18 months based on her allegation that we were within 30 feet of each other. There was also a bullet hole through our window, and the police refused to investigate its origin.
The Routt County prosecutor Elizabeth Wittemyer bought insurance from Underwriters at Lloyds London. I can prove this because her lawyer filed verified copies of his bills to Lloyds. (see attached) These bills and verification under penalty of perjury are available in the federal court District of Colorado document 465 and also in the 10th Circuit court of appeals. The only reference to Lloyds on the state website was a 1996 publication saying that Article 13 regulates the formation of a reciprocal insurance exchange. ... The most famous example of an exchange is Lloyds of London". CRS 10-13-3 requires that such insurance agents file with the Division of Insurance "A copy of the form of policy contract or agreement under or by which such insurance is to be effected or exchanged", "The location of the office from which such contracts or agreements are to be issued" and "The kind of insurance to be effected or exchanged". The Colorado AG’s office has confirmed that it doesn’t have those records.
The magistrate reporting to Nottingham wrote: “David Brougham has advised me that in the event that plaintiffs obtain service upon any of the municipal defendants he will be the attorney for such defendants. In light of that fact, I will direct that Mr. Brougham also attend the status conference” p. 7 “order setting status conference 1/10/03 Magistrate Schlatter” Colorado 02- 1950 document 9, p. 9
The Lloyds’ lawyer billed Lloyds and also another insurance company, Colorado Intergovernmental Risksharing Agency, for over 20 otherwise private calls to and from the court. These billing itemizations included:
1.) On 2/12/03:“Review new letter from Sieverding to Tremaine regarding Jane Bennett and many city defendants. Telephone call to Dave Brougham—discussed pleadings from Wisconsin court and Sieverding letter. Conference call to Magistrate Schlatter. Further discussion with Brougham on notice letter to Sieverding.”(e86, Anthony Lettunich to City of Steamboat Springs, CO) (p.9.) (see exhibit p. )
2.) 2/28/03 “Telephone call from David Brougham regarding new pleading from Sieverding and review pleading with Brougham as to most significant allegations. Telephone call with….and Clerk’s office” (Anthony Lettunich bill to City of Steamboat Springs )
3.) 6/11/03 “Telephone call to court regarding response to motion to compel” (Brougham to Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing)
4.) 6/16/03 “Telephone call to court regarding status of plaintiffs’ response regarding motion to dismiss” (Brougham to CIRSA)
5.) 6/24/03 “Telephone call from Dave Brougham (defense attorney for government defendants) advising me that the Clerk for Magistrate Schlatter advised that no Reply would be necessary”. (Anthony Lettunich bill to City of Steamboat Springs, CO)
6.) “6/23/03 confer with Van Pelt regarding reply issues. Telephone call to Court regarding need for same”.
7.) 7/2/03 “Telephone call from clerk regarding certain motions.”
8.) 8/4/03 “Telephone call to court regarding filings by plaintiffs since (7/31) order”.
9.) 8/14/03“Confer with court clerk regarding status of ruling on motions.”
10.) 8/15/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions and timing of ruling”.
11.) 9/24/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions.”
12.) 10/14/03 “Confer with court clerk regarding filing of recommendation regarding pending motions.”
13.) 10/31/03 “Review actual court file regarding most recent pleadings, ‘striking’ majority of same, confer with court clerk regarding same.”
14.) 11/21/03 “confer with court clerk regarding status of pleadings”
15) 1/07/04 “Confer with court regarding status of plaintiff pleadings, pending motions, etc. Analyze motion to enjoin grounds, etc.”
The Lloyds lawyer, David Brougham, claimed that Kevin Bennett and Elizabeth Wittemeyer had “immunity” and therefore he claimed that he wasn’t required to engage in an evidentiary hearing. Before filing that complaint, I had filed other complaints in other courts that were never served and Brougham claimed that claims preclusion does not require a decision on the merits. Nottingham dismissed my case without filing a memorandum or opinion. When I asked him why, the only reason he stated was his incorrect belief that I “lost in the state court in Steamboat Springs”. I dismissed that case without service so I could refile in federal court. The Supreme Court had ruled many times that a decision on the merits is required for claims preclusion. I relied on and quoted “Finally, if Rule 41(b) did mean what respondent suggests, we would surely have relied upon it in our cases recognizing the claim-preclusive effect of federal judgments in federal-question cases. Yet for over half a century since the promulgation of Rule 41(b), we have not once done so. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 488-489, n. 9 (1994); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, supra, at 398; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 324, n. 12 (1971).” SEMTEK INTERNATIONAL INC. V. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 128 Md.App. 39, 531 U.S. 497, 531 U.S. 497, 736 A.2d 1104, 149 L.Ed.2d 32, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (U.S. 02/27/2001) but Nottingham ignored those Supreme Court cases.
The magistrate wrote, and Nottingham claimed that he approved, “Prosecutors have absolute immunity”. However, as the 5th Circuit explained: “The district court held that the defendants were shielded by absolute immunity because their actions were taken in their role as prosecutors. We disagree. Prosecutors are immune from damage actions brought for conduct performed in the role of a prosecutor. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, the Supreme Court in Imbler left open the question whether this immunity extends to actions in which the prosecutor acts as an investigator or administrator, rather than as an advocate. 96 S.Ct. at 995. We answered this question in Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981). After examining relevant Supreme Court decisions since Imbler, and the policies underlying the immunity defense and section 1983, we held that "a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he engages in activities outside his quasi-judicial role." 625 F.2d at 510. Hardy W. RYLAND and Alma Odessa Ryland, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alfred B. SHAPIRO, et al., Defendants, Edwin O. Ware and Edward E. Roberts, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
Wittemyer’s statements were given to the press and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
Comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process just because they are made by a prosecutor. At the press conference, Fitzsimmons did not act in "'his role as advocate for the State,'"… The conduct of a press conference does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions…. the speech of a counsel is privileged by the occasion on which it is spoken " Stephen Buckley v. Michael Fitzsimmons et al. USC 1993.
Wittemyer acted in conspiracy with city council president Kevin Bennett to deter me and undermine my complaints that the City of Steamboat Springs was allowing Bennett to build in violation of the zoning and therefore the complaint was cognizable under 42 USC § 1983. Further proof of the conspiracy is that Jane Bennett’s lawyer represented to the county judge that there were criminal charges against me in a successful effort to get a restraining order against me.
To stop me from getting an evidentiary hearing before another judge, Nottingham issued an order against further litigation in both state and federal courts, although there was no statutory basis and the Supreme Court ruled: “Any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper by general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions [to the Anti-Injunction Act]…. not to be enlarged by loose statutory constructions.” ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. ENGINEERS 398 U.S. 281 U.S. Supreme Court 1970.
In Nottingham’s court, no statutory exemption to the Anti-Injunction Act was cited, there was no motion for an injunction, no injunction bond, and nothing complying with Rule 65(d), which prohibits an injunction from referencing a complaint or other document. This violated the Anti-Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
Because Nottingham found no facts and stated no laws when he dismissed our case, no party can point to anywhere in 02-cv-1950 and show where there was a decision on the merits. The order against litigation was a way to evade the limits of the res judicata defense, that there be a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court had ruled that “It is settled that the prohibition of §2283 (the Anti Injunction Act) cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties” (OKLAHOMA PACKING CO. V. GAS CO. 309 U.S. C 4 9 U.S. Supreme Court 1940) but, when I tried to get a hearing from another court, Nottingham claimed that he could enforce an order against litigation by putting me in jail to force me to do what he wanted. The Supreme Court ruled in YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS, 481 U. S. 787 (1987), “The manner in which the court's prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by Congress…. the court erred in appointing as prosecutors counsel for an interested party in the underlying civil litigation… "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." Because of this unique responsibility, federal prosecutors are prohibited from representing the Government in any matter in which they, their family, or their business associates have any interest. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a)…. If a Justice Department attorney pursued a contempt prosecution for violation of an injunction benefiting any client of that attorney involved in the underlying civil litigation, that attorney would be open to a charge of committing a felony under § 208(a). Furthermore, such conduct would violate the ABA ethical provisions, since the attorney could not discharge the obligation of undivided loyalty to both clients where both have a direct interest. [Footnote 16] The Government's interest is in dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary. The private party's interest is in obtaining the benefits of the court's order. While these concerns sometimes may be congruent, sometimes they may not. A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal charges…. as will generally be the case, the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum created opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at least the appearance of impropriety….. prosecution by an interested party may be influenced by improper motives. A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity…. As we said in Bloom, "In modern times, procedures in criminal contempt cases have come to mirror those used in ordinary criminal cases." 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 207. The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with that trend, since "[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision….. We rely today on that authority to hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order.
Nottingham ignored the Supreme Court’s decisions in ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. ENGINEERS, OKLAHOMA PACKING CO. V. GAS CO, and YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS as well as their decisions about immunity and res judicata.
Without any sort of criminal procedure, or any finding that I disturbed a hearing committing “contempt in the presence of the court”, Nottingham ordered USMS to hold me until I did what he wanted. Four months later I agreed to do what he wanted because he threatened to incarcerate my husband too if I didn’t. That was not among the allowed conditions for release from jail. When I didn’t file the motions he demanded in other courts, he issued a defective warrant for my arrest that didn’t state a federal offense on it, wasn’t requested by a government attorney, and wasn’t signed by the Clerk of Court. USMS hunted me down without a valid warrant. When I filed a motion for reconsideration, in another court, Nottingham issued another defective warrant, which again was not requested by an attorney for the government and didn’t state a federal offense. Again USMS hunted me down without a court issued detention order and without a valid warrant. Nottingham informed authorities in Wisconsin that he wanted me detained and brought to him and I was again denied a bail hearing and that time was held for 22 days and brought 1200 miles in chains. I was denied my rights to a probable cause hearing, a Rule 20 hearing, and a bail hearing. Then, after years of abuse and harassment and messing up my actions in other courts, Nottingham said “whoops” and released me.
B.) Summary of Facts:
1.) I have no criminal record at all. I verified every document I filed in every court under penalty of perjury but I have not even been accused of perjury.
2.) Former judge Nottingham ordered me imprisoned by USMS without any criminal procedure three times totaling 5 months as part of an extortionist scheme to deprive my rights to present testimony and file documents in the District of Columbia federal courts and this creates jurisdiction for prosecution for witness intimidation in the District of Columbia.
3.) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42 defines contempt procedure. Summary procedure may only used when there was a disruption of a courtroom. This did not happen in my case. Summary procedure was used in a prescheduled “contempt of court” hearing to address my having filed motions in other courts in violation of former judge Nottingham’s order. Nottingham did not issue the required statement describing “contempt in the presence of the court” and he did not follow the rules of criminal procedure as required. The Sieverdings filed a motion for the procedure to be used but Nottingham denied that as well as their motion for statement of irreparable harm, a statutory requirement for an injunction. See 02-cv-1950 documents 596, 587, 588.
4.) USDOJ has represented in the Federal Register that its Prisoner Tracking Systems are used to hold people who are in custody “pending criminal proceedings”. Congressional appropriations do not include funds for holding citizens without a statutory basis. (See Federal Register Vo. 69 No 89 pp 23213 – 23316)
5.) USDOJ represents on its website and in the Federal Register that prosecution of violations of injunctions are obsolete and refers Congress and the public to contempt is now prosecuted under 18 USC §§s 3285, 3691, 3692 and 10 USC 847, none of which I was charged with. (See Federal Register 63 FR 8659, 8671/ 02/20/98)
6.) USDOJ represents publicly that pretrial detention must serve a “compelling government purpose” (See US Attorney Criminal Resource Manual 26 p. 1)
7.) I was held in Dane County Jail at USMS request for 21 days although by contract with USMS, the jail can only hold “federal detainees, defined as individuals sentenced or charged with a federal offense” even though she was not charged with a federal offense. (See contract 13-01-0032)
8.) I was held at Clear Creek CO jail at USMS request for 124 days although under the county’s contract with USMS, the jail can only hold “persons charged with or convicted of violations of federal law or as a material witness” and she was not a material witness, nor charged with a violation of federal law. (See contract 13-96-0033).
C.) Discussion of judicial immunity issues and citations.
1.) The US Code specifically states that there is no immunity defense for solicitation of a crime of violence and that detention is a crime of violence absent proper criminal procedure.
1.1 ) "Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) or fined.... It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person solicited could not be convicted of the crime because he lacked the state of mind required for its commission, because he was incompetent or irresponsible, or because he is immune from prosecution or is not subject to prosecution." See 18 USC Sec. 373. Solicitation to commit a crime of violence
1.2 ) “The term “physical force” means physical action against another, and includes confinement” see Title 18 § 1515. Definitions for certain provisions.
2.) The Supreme Court has already ruled that a judge can be criminally prosecuted under 18 USC § 242 and other criminal statutes as are other citizens.
2.1) “But judicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability. Judges are immune from section 1983 damages actions, but they are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). DENNIS v. SPARKS ET AL., 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 11/17/1980)
2.2) “Judges who would willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U. S. C. § 242… Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), or civil liability for willful corruption, see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 110-111 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 350, 354 (1872), we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. . . ." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).” O'SHEA v. LITTLETON ET AL., 94 S. Ct. 669, 414 U.S. 488 (U.S. 01/15/1974)
D.) Additional detail and references to statutes and transcripts of court hearings:
1.) On 9/2/05 former judge Nottingham made these threatening statements. They meet the statutory definitions of witness intimidation and extortion:
“I have three United States Marshals here ready to put you in jail. And I am determined to do so, but reluctant to do so. So I’ll ask you one last time, will you withdraw these lawsuits voluntarily?” Nottingham (p. 26 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
“If you fail to withdraw those lawsuits, the next time you’re in this court you better be prepared with your toothbrush, because you will be going to jail. Do you understand that?” Nottingham (page 33 lines 3-5 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
1.1) See 18 USC § 1512 The Witness Intimidation Act “(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;(2) cause or induce any person to –(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;….
1.2) “(h) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.(i) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.”
1.3) (b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for—
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both” 18 USC § 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
1.3.1) Nottingham ordered me taken to him in Colorado. On 6/1/07 Nottingham said “don't we have to start over again on that and look at what she's done and see if what she's done is -- supports another finding of contempt? We need to start over on the contempt proceedings, figure out what it is she's done and when she's done it, and see if that supports any finding of contempt…she could face a jail sentence.” transcript 6/1/07 Nottingham 02-cv-1950.
2.) By imprisoning me to stop me from petitioning other courts, Nottingham deprived me of my 1st Amendment Right to Petition
2.1) “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (First Amendment)
3.) By imprisoning me to stop me from petitioning other courts, Nottingham ignored 28 USC § 1654.
3.1) “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein” 28 USC § 1654. Appearance personally or by counsel
4.) By imprisoning me without charging me with a federal offense, Nottingham deprived me of my 4th Amendment Rights:
4.1) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (4th amendment)
4.2) I was seized and held for over 4 months on Nottingham’s order without a statement of probable cause supported by oath and without a warrant.
4.2.1) Disrupting a courtroom is a crime and Rule 42 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure describes the procedure to be used, but I was not even accused of disrupting a courtroom, and Rule 42 was not followed.
5.) By imprisoning me three times without charging me with a federal offense, for the stated purpose of depriving me of my cause of action in another court, Nottingham three times deprived me of my 5th Amendment Rights.
5.1) “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 5th Amendment
5.2) Due process of law when depriving a person of their liberty is defined in the Rules of Criminal Procedure but Nottingham knowingly and intentionally skipped every component of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.) On 9/02/05, there was no government prosecutor and there was no criminal docket. In a criminal prosecution, a criminal docket is opened when a government prosecutor opens a criminal prosecution by filing a criminal complaint or indictment, or when an authorized law enforcement officer makes an arrest immediately followed by a criminal complaint (i.e. apprehended subject on Indian Reservation, US Courthouse, National park etc. seeing subject standing with a gun over a dead body). (See PACER District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 884)
6.1) In response to my FOIA letters, USDOJ stated that the District of Colorado, where Nottingham issued verbal and minute orders to detain me, that the “US Attorney’s Office was not involved in the cases concerning Kay Sieverding”. See PACER document record D.D.C. 09-cv-00562 Sieverding v. USDOJ document 7-2 p. 9, letter from William G. Stewart II AD Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys Freedom of Information & Privacy Staff dated 11/26/08.
6.2) The District of Colorado Office of the Clerk responded to my request for warrants for arrest by mailing that “A search of the court records does not show a criminal case(s) for Kay Sieverding”. See scan of communication from Gregory C. Langham Clerk of Court District of Colorado in District of Columbia PACER reports Case 1:09-cv-00562-JDB Document 20-2 Filed 07/08/2009 Page 41 of 196
6.3) All of the rules of procedure published on the various U.S. Court websites are either civil or criminal or both. None of them are “other procedure, not civil or criminal” and the lower courts are prohibited from creating unpublished procedures. See Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
7.) The Supreme Court ordered that counsel who have a financial motivation are prohibited from serving as prosecutors in a contempt action. See YOUNG V. U.S. EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS, 481 U. S. 787 (1987) but Nottingham allowed them to serve as prosecutors anyway.
7.1) Nottingham said at what he called a contempt of court conference to the civil insurance defense lawyer contracted by Mutual Insurance of Bermuda: “Now, Mr. Beall, I understand that you are taking the lead on this one, so to speak?” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 3
8.) On 9/02/05, I was taken into indefinite length custody at Nottingham’s order without a detention hearing complying with 18 USC § 3553(a)(2) B-D and 3142(f)(1). B requires criminal conduct. At that time, I had never failed to appear in a court hearing. At no time did I attempt to obstruct justice. Therefore according to the Federal Judicial Commission, Nottingham couldn’t hold a detention hearing based on his own motion.
8.1) Nottingham was specifically not allowed to deprive my liberty for any purpose not necessary for section 3553(a)(2) B-D which are: “(B) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;”
8.2) “Section 3142(f)(1) provides that a detention hearing shall be held
on the government’s motion in a case involving (1) a crime of violence; (2) an offense carrying a penalty of life imprisonment or death; (3) a federal drug offense carrying a penalty of ten years or more; or (4) any felony following convictions for two or more of the above three offenses, two or more comparable state or local offenses, or a combination of such offenses. The court may hold a hearing on its own motion or the government’s motion in a case that involves serious risk of flight or serious risk that the person will attempt to obstruct justice” Bail Reform Act of 1984 p. 12
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf
9.) On 9/02/05, there were no sworn witnesses and Nottingham would not allow cross examination of witnesses. However the Federal Judicial Commission writes that there is a recognized right to cross-examine witnesses at a detention hearing.
9.1) “Section 3142(f) affords defendants an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses appearing at the hearing”. http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf p. 25
9.2) On 9/02/05 Nottingham said: “You’re going to be allowed to make a presentation but its not the presentation that you probably had in mind because I’m not going to listen” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 20
9.2.1) Nottingham denied me my right to put on a defense.
9.3) “They do not have the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing”.
See transcript 9/02/05 Nottingham’s court 02-cv-1950 document 884 pp. 13-14.
9.4) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” 6th Amendment
10.) On 9/02/05, I was taken into what ended up being 124 days of straight detention on Nottingham’s order without information or indictment being filed within 30 days as required by statute and by the 6th Amendment:
10.1) “Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. The Act establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. The information or indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of arrest or service of the summons. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (See US Attorneys criminal resource manual 628).
10.2) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial” 6th amendment.
10.3) “Given the unchallenged determination that petitioner was denied a speedy trial, the District Court judgment of conviction must be set aside” STRUNK v. UNITED STATES, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 412 U.S. 434 (U.S. 06/11/1973)
11.) The Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee a right to counsel but I was told in Nottingham’s presence that I did not have a right to counsel and he did not object.
11.1) “At the detention hearing, defendants have the right to an attorney and the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford one.” Bail Reform Act of 1984 p 24 http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf
11.2) “They do not have a right to counsel” See D of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 9/02/05 document 884 p. 13 (Christopher Beall, an insurance lawyer)
11.3) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 6th amendment
12.) Nottingham released both my husband and myself based on orders that we would not continue in civil litigation in other courts. That violated 18 U.S.C.§ 3583 because it was a greater deprivation of liberty than “necessary for” any government purpose since the allowed purposes are enumerated. It was a deprivation of my rights for former judge Nottingham to say that I couldn’t file motions or appear in other courts.
12.1) “The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition - (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D), (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issue by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a);”18 U.S.C.§ 3583. Inclusion of a term of supervised release after imprisonment)
12.2) “If you fail to withdraw those lawsuits, the next time you appear in this court you better bring your toothbrush because you are going to jail.” Nottingham to David Sieverding on 9/02/05 (page 33 lines 3-5 transcript PACER D of CO 02-cv-1950 document 884)
12.3) “So you’ll stay out of jail if all these cases are dismissed in time for me to vacate the hearing. Otherwise the next time you show up, you pack your toothbrush, because you are going to jail….Are the defendants suggesting that the plaintiff be jailed until she purges herself of her contempt? P. 6 …” you can’t weasel out of it.” P. 10. 2/14/06 transcript document 876 Judge Nottingham
13.) Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a) requires that a written statement of reasons accompany a release order, but on 1/4/06 Nottingham released me pursuant to an oral agreement to do what he wanted and without a written statement.
13.1) There is a standard USCOURTS form for conditional release based on statutes but Nottingham didn’t use it.
13.2) The trial court “must explain its reasons for determining that the particular requirement is an indispensable component of the conditions for release.” Bail Reform Act of 1984 http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bailref.pdf/$File/bailref.pdf P.3.
14.) On 2/2/06, Nottingham issued a warrant for my arrest that didn’t reference a criminal statute and wasn’t accompanied by a statement of probable cause and this violated my 4th amendment rights again.
15.) On 9/22/06, Nottingham issued another warrant for my arrest that didn’t reference a criminal statute and wasn’t accompanied by a statement of probable cause and this violated my 4th amendment rights again.
16.) I downloaded over 60 warrants for arrest for the District of Colorado from PACER and Nottingham’s warrant for my arrest was substantially different than all the others.
16.1) It was not captioned “U.S.A. v Kay Sieverding” but instead was captioned “Kay Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association).
16.2) It was not requested by an attorney for the government.
16.3) Nottingham didn’t sign the warrant and neither did the clerk of court. The only signature was from Nottingham’s docket clerk.
16.4) All the other warrants had a written description of a crime and also the numbers of the crime but the one for me had neither.
16.5) All the other warrants had fill in the blank squares but mine did not.
17.) On 9/22/06, Nottingham made this threatening statement:
“She knows that she is not to pursue those lawsuits. And for her to suggest that I told her to dismiss those lawsuits, and that does not cover her appeals from those lawsuits is silly…she might dismiss everything before those marshals get to her…once she’s in custody she will not get out of custody until those are actually dismissed…She was told in unequivocal terms to dismiss both those lawsuits …what has to happen is those lawsuits have to be dead, lifeless, and she is not to do anything to pursue them on appeal, motion for reconsideration, or anything else... she faces a real possibility of incarceration as she knows because it’s happened before” 9/22/06 transcript District of Colorado Judge Edward Nottingham 02-1950
18.) On 5/11/07, according to then District of Western Wisconsin clerk of court/magistrate Theresa Owens, Nottingham told her that he wanted me detained and brought to him even though he knew there was no legal reason for it and his requesting that I be brought to him exceeded his jurisdiction. I was not charged with a crime and I was not a reluctant witness. Assistant US Attorney Robert A. Anderson appeared and said “the government is not a party to this”. Nottingham had me held for three weeks without charges and brought 1200 miles in chains and when I got there he said “whoops” and let her go. It was clearly witness retaliation and he thought no one would hold him accountable.
18.1) On 5/11/07 I was denied her right to a Bail Hearing and then she was held at Nottingham’s order for three weeks. The public defender argued that she had a right to a bail hearing if she was accused of a crime but the supervising clerk/magistrate denied that, in conspiracy with Nottingham. See DWWI 06-mj-00019-slc document 10 transcript
18.2) 28 U.S.C. § 1693 speaks for itself and says “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil action in a district court.” but Nottingham in Colorado ordered me arrested in Wisconsin for a civil matter in Colorado.
19.) Nottingham caused the defective warrants and other written threats to be sent to me and therefore I believe the communications were extortion – mailing threatening statements designed to extort from me something of value, my claims in other courts:
19.1) “Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any communication, with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to injure the property or
reputation of the addressee or of another, or the reputation of a deceased person, or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both” 18 U.S.C. § 876 : US Code - Section 876: Mailing threatening communications.
19.2) “Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color or pretense of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; but if the amount so extorted or demanded does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 872. Extortion by officers or employees of the United States
20.) The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that injunctions without laws are a matter of great public importance.
20.1) “Mr. Justice Holland in Kellner v. District Court (1953), 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, said that a case in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the persons or subject matter also involves a matter of great public importance. Thus construing our rules and the cases we have referred to, we determine that the facts here involved present matters of sufficient public importance to call for the intervention of this court to prevent a manifest injustice. The Rule is made absolute.” Stull v. District Court of Pueblo County, 308 P.2d 1006, 135 Colo. 86 (Colo. 03/18/1957)
21.) I believe that Nottingham’s acts towards me were crimes and that they were premeditated as shown by his refusal to state the procedures that would be used, his refusal to state a statutory basis, his striking the Sieverdings’ motion for the statement of harm to the complaining parties, which is required and his continuation and repetition of the crimes.
22.) Nottingham hired a criminal defense attorney, Stephen C. Peters, and I wrote to him twice to ask if Nottingham was guilty of Witness Retaliation and Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law but he did not deny it.
23.) The Supreme Court has already recognized that a cause of action is property. Nottingham’s stated intention was to take that cause of action from me by forcing me to file motions to dismiss, keeping me from going to a law-library, causing other judges to think of me as a crazy weirdo instead of a competent individual, and causing delay.
24.) Lack of prosecution for use of threats of violence under Color of Law as a vehicle to stop presentment in court contradicts the Principles of Federal Prosecution:
24.1) USDOJ publishes a report 9-27.000 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION stating that:
“The attorney for the government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person' s conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, prosecution should be declined because:
1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution;
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or
3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”
24.2) Nottingham has escaped all investigation and prosecution simply by resigning his federal judgeship and he is now selling his services as a lawyer.
24.3) The State of Colorado Supreme Court has already ruled that the issuing of an injunction without a law is a matter of great public interest.
24.4) This is an easy to imitate crime and the insurance company involved, Underwriters at Lloyds London, apparently sells insurance all over the United States.
24.5.) The potential punishment for solicitation of a crime of violence is 20 years.
24.5.) If prosecuted as Witness Intimidation, under 18 USC § 1512, the use of threat of force to delay, prevent or deter presentment, is punishable by 10-20 years.
24.6) I wouldn’t have resisted the extortion the way that I did, sitting in jail without charges for over 4 months, if the underlying litigation wasn’t very important to me. Nottingham denied me not only compensation from my lawsuit, but also a name-clearing hearing after the Lloyds’ customer brought charges against me without being even willing to say what the probable cause was, a clear constitutional violation. Nottingham denied my motion for discovery of the probable cause for which Wittemyer prosecuted me. In my opinion, Nottingham tried to make me unemployable, tried to get my husband to abandon me, and tried to induce me to commit suicide.
25.) Even though Nottingham has not yet been charged, because I was hurt by what I believe were federal crimes I have rights as a crime victim under the Justice for All Act of 2004:
25.1) No federal prosecutor has yet met with my husband and or myself to discuss USDOJ’s decisions to prosecute or not prosecute Nottingham as is required by the Justice for All Act of 2004, and I was denied my enumerated rights:
25.1.1) “For purposes of the Act, a victim is “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia… Either the crime victim or the Government may assert the victim’s rights in the district court.” I have been denied my enumerated rights including “The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.… “The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case. The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law…. The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” See
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/justforall/fs000311.pdf
25.1.2) “The investigative agency’s responsibilities begin with the report of the crime and extend through the prosecution of the case….. Responsible officials must advise a victim pursuant to this section at the earliest opportunity after detection of a crime at which it may be done without interfering with an investigation…. The responsible official of the investigative agency shall arrange for a victim to receive reasonable protection from a suspected offender and persons acting in concert with or at the behest of the suspected offender…. Upon request by a victim or witness, the responsible official should assist in notifying— The creditors of the victim or witness, when appropriate, if the crime or cooperation in its investigation affects his or her ability to make timely payments… Upon filing of charges by the prosecutor, this responsibility transfers to the responsible official of the prosecutor’s office… For cases in which a litigating division of the Department of Justice is solely responsible, the responsible official is the chief of the section having responsibility for the case. The Department attorney handling such a case shall perform the same duties under these AG Guidelines as are required of a U.S. Attorney.”
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
26.) I believe I have a right to mandatory restitution for what I believe were Nottingham’s crimes against me.
26.1.) “The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 expanded mandatory restitution to virtually all crimes committed in violation of Title 18 of the United States Code.” (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A) see
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf p. 8.
26.2.) “For purposes of providing the services described in these AG guidelines, a victim is “a person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime.” (42 U.S.C. ' 10607(e)(2)) http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf p.9.
26.3) “Prosecutors, victim-witness coordinators, investigators, probation officers, clerks of the court, and financial litigation units all share an important role in ensuring that victims receive full and timely restitution. DOJ employees working at each stage of a criminal case—investigating, charging, negotiating plea agreements, advocating for appropriate sentences, and enforcing criminal judgments—must give careful consideration to the need to provide full restitution to the victims of the offenses and should work together as authorized by law to ensure that full and timely restitution is paid… http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
26.4) The MVRA requires courts to impose the full amount of restitution (without regard to the defendant’s economic circumstances) in most of the commonly prosecuted Federal offenses, including virtually all Title 18 property offenses and all crimes of violence. (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A) The only exception to mandatory restitution is for an offense against property with respect to which the court makes a finding from facts on the record either that (a) the number of identifiable victims is so large that restitution is impracticable or (b) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victims’ losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. (18 U.S.C. ' 3663A(c)(3)) http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf
27.) Nottingham also violated the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 14-19 by incarcerating me for acts not recognized as crimes in international law. I’m considering filing a complaint with the United Nations because the United States violated the International Covenant by incarcerating me without a criminal charge.
27.1) Article 14 “To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it” but I was told that I didn’t have a right to a lawyer.
27.2) Article 14 “To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him” but I was told in Nottingham’s presence that I was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and I was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses.
27.3) Article 14 “Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt” but Nottingham said he would not release me unless I filed a motions that would have effectively said that I was guilty of being a vexatious litigant.”
27.4) Article 15 “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.” but Nottingham jailed me for filing papers in other courts.
27.5) Article 16 “Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law” but Nottingham stated in Court that he had called other courts and asked them to dismiss my case. Christopher Beall also stated in Nottingham’s court that he had called the clerk in another court and asked them to dismiss my case.
27.6) Article 17 “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” but noone at USDOJ has protected me.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
Kay Sieverding 1/29/10
641 Basswood Ave. Verona WI 53593 608-848-5721 kaysieverding@aol.com
Certificate of service
Sunday, February 21, 2010
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)